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Abstract:   Researchers have analyzed whether US welfare reform has induced interstate migration. 
Empirical results are inconclusive because methodologies are based on pre-reform 
thinking. This paper presents a post-reform migration model. We find that recipients 
move to avoid harsh sanction policies, seek lenient work requirements, and extend time 
limits. Unlike the first two behavioral responses, the latter is controversial. Critics will 
argue that such moves are illegal, and violators can be prosecuted because states share 
data. However, only active cases are being shared, meaning violators cannot be caught. 
Our model produces testable hypotheses which are consistent with (and reconcile) 
previous empirical results.
I. InTROdUCTIOn
In 1996, sweeping reforms of the U.S. welfare system were enacted to deal with concerns that 
Aid for Families with dependent Children (AFdC) discouraged work, increased dependence, 
1  Corresponding author: (hwsnarr@ncat.edu)UnintEndEd migrAtion consEqUEncEs of Us WElfArE rEform 
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and drove up out-of-wedlock fertility. Temporary Assistance for needy Families (TAnF) 
replaced AFdC. Under TAnF, states were charged with developing their own programs. The 
devolution in welfare policy that ensued (documented extensively in Blank 2002) increased 
interstate diversity in welfare rules and benefit levels, resulting in substantial variation in the 
harshness of TAnF policies across states. Thus, welfare reform has expanded the potential set 
of welfare-related migration incentives (de Jong, Graefe, and St. Pierrre 2005).
Empirical studies of welfare migration have focused primarily on benefit differentials 
between states (e.g., Southwick 1981, Gramlich and Laren 1984, Blank 1988, Enchautegui 1997). 
Moffit’s (1992) review of the AFdC migration literature concluded that benefit differentials 
had a significant effect on migration, but later studies contradicted this (Walker 1994, Levine 
and Zimmerman 1999). Results published in Meyer (2000) and McKinnish (2005, 2007) 
appeared to have reconciled the debate, suggesting that benefit levels have a significant but 
small effect on migration. However, recently published results in Kennan and Walker (2010) 
indicate that migration is triggered by differences in state income levels rather than benefits. 
Some  research  has  emerged  using  TAnF-era  data  which  examines  the  migration 
consequences of work requirements, time limits, and sanctions. Kaestner, Kaushal, and Van 
Ryzin (2003) found evidence of welfare migration; however, they attributed most of it to 
enhanced employment opportunities (i.e., differences in minimum wages, unemployment, and/
or reliance on service industries) across geographic areas, rather than differences in welfare 
benefits across states. de Jong, Graefe, and St. Pierrre (2005) also found that states with strictly 
enforced welfare-to-work policies induced out-migration, but not necessarily to other states 
with more lenient welfare policies. They also noted that the impact was no different between 
single mothers and other cohorts receiving welfare benefits. According to Graefe, de Jong, 
and May (2006) stringent state welfare exemption rules (for participants who are disabled or 
ill or caring for disabled or ill family members) inhibit in-migration and boost out-migration. 
The question that naturally arises is, “Why has the literature failed to form a consensus 
on welfare migration and its causes, provided it is indeed occurring?” One very general 
explanation is that the literature is primarily empirical in nature, and does not rely on a reliable 
theoretical foundation. Many studies (e.g., Brueckner 2000) effectively utilize TAnF-era data 
to test hypotheses and theories derived from AFdC-era rules, which may lead to untenable 
inferences. Kaestner, Kaushal, and Van Ryzin (2003) posit that time limits decrease migration 
because time limits lower the present value of benefit differentials. However, this thesis assumes 
welfare households are forward looking, which has been questioned in de Jong, Graefe, and 
St. Pierre (2005) and Snarr and Axelsen (2008).
In contrast to Kaestner, Kaushal, and Van Ryzin (2003)’s thesis, Snarr and Burkey (2006) 
posit just the opposite for recipients living near state borders because moving to the bordering 
state is inexpensive and extends time limits. “Welfare-flipping”, as they called it, is possible 
only if states do not effectively share data, which was flagged previously by duncan, Harris, 
and Boisjoly (1997). Snarr and Burkey’s empirical evidence suggests that (after controlling 
for unemployment rates, socio-economic characteristics, and related factors) some welfare 
recipients migrate to extend their benefits; however, the incentive diminishes with distance. As 
such, welfare migration is more likely to occur along state borders (e.g., from Kansas City, KS 
to Kansas City, MO). despite its novelty, their (simple) two-period model, unfortunately, did HAl W. snArr, dAniEl friEsnEr And mArk l. bUrkEy
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not incorporate decision-making myopia, labor market attachment/detachment, time-related 
factors that influence the migration decision (including work trigger time limits, lengths of 
sanction periods, and expected future labor market conditions) and socio-cultural characteristics. 
Critics of welfare-flipping may argue it does not occur because it is illegal, and if states 
were really worried about it, they could simply share data. Currently, all states use the Public 
Assistance Reporting Information System (PARIS) to detect duplicate interstate public assistance 
payments in programs including (but not limited to) TAnF and Supplemental nutrition Assistance 
Program (SnAP). PARIS, initiated in 1997, uses social security numbers (SSns) to generate 
federal, veteran, and interstate matches. The first two detect overpayments to those failing to 
declare income and healthcare benefits from all federal sources, while the Interstate Match 
(IM)—the one of interest in this study—determines if benefits are received in more than one 
state. According to Bell et al. (2007), states submit cases that are active at some point during 
the month data is submitted. Thus, IM detects double dippers (participants receiving benefits in 
multiple states simultaneously) but not welfare flippers. To detect the latter, states would need 
to submit SSns from closed cases to match with SSns of current recipients in other states. Even 
if states were looking, it is unlikely that action would be taken. After all, as Bell et al. (2007) 
note, follow-up action is weak and varied, with states investigating between 1% and 25% of 
suspected fraud in the system (with Washington State at the low end and Utah at the other). 
Critics might also claim that even if welfare-flipping is occurring, the respective costs 
are minuscule. Although welfare flipping is not detectable with IM, double dipping is. If it is 
rampant, as Table 1 suggests, welfare flipping is potentially problematic as well. According 
to Table 1, as the number of states participating in PARIS tripled from 2000 to 2008, IM more 
than tripled. In 2010, there were just over one million possible double dippers, up 29% from 
2009. Ballooning IM potentially equates to billions of dollars in fraudulent payments since the 
rollout of PARIS. ACF reports that TAnF and SnAP double-dippers cost d.C. about one million 
dollars from 2000 to 2003, while detection saves Pennsylvania nearly $67 million per year.2
 Table 1: Interstate Matches (IM) for the Month of August
Year Participants SSns submitted IM Percent IM
2000 14 9,318,649 55,369 0.59
2001 15 10,326,915 68,572 0.66
2002 18 10,903,263 48,065 0.44
2003 19 12,583,707 66,638 0.53
2004 22 16,907,210 103,110 0.61
2005 21 16,256,076 81,482 0.50
2006 28 20,982,503 129,773 0.62
2007 37 30,446,549 289,052 0.95
2008 42 34,451,178 645,284 1.87
2009 52 44,682,240 814,165 1.82
2010 52 52,747,788 1,047,503 1.99
Source: http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/paris/state_info/stateresult.html
2  See http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/paris/state_info/succ_par.html (last accessed on July 23, 2010).UnintEndEd migrAtion consEqUEncEs of Us WElfArE rEform 
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According to Snarr (forthcoming), in an era of work requirements, sanctions and time 
limits, unemployed workers turn first to unemployment insurance (UI) and then enroll in TAnF 
assistance to smooth consumption. This is one potential explanation for the 29% increase in 
the number of potential double-dippers from 2009 to 2010 (most likely due to very sluggish 
recovery of the deepest recession in the U.S. since the Great depression). Migration from high 
to low unemployment rate states, which has been observed in the latest U.S. Census, does not 
guarantee low income workers employment. Thus, migrant workers, who were unable to find 
employment, are likely to enroll in their new states’ TAnF programs even if they exhausted 
TAnF benefits in other states. In addition, low income migrating workers who land jobs in 
their new states may augment low wages with TAnF benefits even if benefits were previously 
exhausted. The extension of UI benefits to 99 weeks means low-skilled workers’ human capital 
will depreciate more than had benefits remained at 26 weeks. This will make it even more 
difficult for the ill-educated to find employment. Thus, double-dipping and welfare-flipping 
are likely to be even more of a drain on already tight state and federal budgets. 
The above discussion raises the question: How can state and federal governments afford to 
enforce TAnF time limits in the very sluggish U.S. recovery? If enforcement is retrospective, 
as it is with tax evasion, time limit enforcement costs would be relatively high, and the amount 
of recovered funds would likely be very low. However, if enforcement is prospective, the long 
term costs (after altering the computer code to allow the extra information to be recorded 
and stored in the database) would be negligible because program coordinators would simply 
need to check the database to see that applicants have not exhausted eligibility in other states 
prior to enrolling individuals in the new state of residence. As such, the costs of prospectively 
checking the database would likely be offset by identifying a small percentage of individuals 
who, if allowed to welfare-flip, would receive a relatively large amount of public subsidies 
over the (new) timeframe of TAnF eligibility.
This paper presents a more comprehensive TAnF-era economic welfare-migration model, 
incorporating de Jong, Graefe and St. Pierrre’s (2005) primary concerns3 and the inability 
of PARIS to detect welfare flipping. Our model accomplishes these tasks by including time-
specific, future information that influences current migration decisions. In doing so, our 
model generates testable hypotheses about which factors matter in making welfare-migration 
decisions. If multiple factors are found to matter, secondary attention is paid to which factors 
matter more in framing the migration decision.
II. THE MOdEL4
Consider the decision problem of the head of a typical welfare eligible family, henceforth referred 
to as “eligible(s)”. The eligible (and her/his family) is in her/his final month of eligibility at date 
3  PRWORA altered the migration decision. Work requirements, sanctions for noncompliance, time limits, 
and benefit reduction rates (tax on welfare recipients’ earnings) combined with the earned income tax credit   
(negative income tax on welfare recipients’ earnings) and the freedom states were granted to design TAnF   
programs created significant state heterogeneity in welfare policy with regards to eligibility and behavior- 
related rules. Hence, de Jong, Graefe and St. Pierre were concerned that welfare-related migration is now   
motivated by more than just differences in benefit levels.
4  Table A1 contains a list of all parameters and variables used in the model.HAl W. snArr, dAniEl friEsnEr And mArk l. bUrkEy
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i = 0, and lives distance d from the nearest viable migration destination. If eligibles migrate, 
m equals one, but equals zero otherwise. Moving allows eligibles to re-enroll in TAnF, which 
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where m is the disutility associated with moving, β is the discount rate, u = c + llnl, c is the 
(real dollar value of the) eligible’s consumption, l denotes leisure activities, and l > 0 represents 
disattachment from the labor market. While u is admittedly simplistic, it is nonetheless consistent 
with both the literature and practical considerations of eligibles.6 
Given that monetary income levels accruing to eligibles are relatively low, we assume 
that all income is spent in the period it is earned/awarded (Edin and Lein 1997). Income 
includes earnings (wH or wh) and benefits (G), where H (h) is the number of monthly hours 
worked off (on) welfare, respectively, and wi is the (real) hourly wage rate (in many cases a 
prevailing real minimum wage) at date i. Work undertaken while receiving welfare benefits is 
subsidized by a combined state and federal earned income credit rate e, which is offset by the 
state benefit reduction rate b. We assume eligibles receive the earned income credit because 
they are typically employed in relatively low-paying jobs (Axelsen, Underwood and Friesner 
2009; Underwood, Axelsen and Friesner 2010), and let e denote the earned income credit rate. 
Aggregating this information from date i = 0 onwards for eligibles who do not move (m = 0) 
yields lifetime budget constraint:
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where E denotes expectations at the beginning of the planning horizon, τ = e – b, and h is at 
least as much as minimum work requirement  . h  As an aside, we note in passing that prior to 
TAnF (or under the AFdC policy regime), this budget constraint is
  .  (2)
The budget constraint is more complicated when eligibles move. The fixed and variable 
costs of moving (relative to distance) are denoted F and k d, respectively (Snarr and Burkey 
2006). Eligibles are also faced with the new state’s work trigger limit7 (t denotes its length in 
5  Restarting TAnF clocks is possible because states submit SSns of active cases to PARIS, and are prohibited 
from imposing minimum residency requirements (ct. Rosenheim 1970 and Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
1999).
6  Eligibles’ marginal utility of consumption is relatively constant according to Edin and Lein (1997) because 
monetary benefits are sufficiently low to ensure that few discretionary expenditures exist in the typical   
welfare recipient’s budget. On the other hand, the marginal utility of leisure diminishes because recipients   
support young children, and are required to work or face benefit sanctions. More detailed characteristics of   
utility functions, including (but not limited to) time-inconsistent preferences, diminishing marginal utility  of 
consumption, or relative risk aversion could be incorporated in u but would be “differenced” out after  the 
decision set is reduced to m. Thus, a more detailed specification of u is unwarranted.
7  nonexempt recipients are required to participate in work activities within 24 months of enrolling in TAnF.   
Variability in the implementation of this policy is substantial. For example, Montana’s work trigger is 24   
months, California’s is 18, South dakota’s is 2, but in Wisconsin it is zero (Gallagher et al. 1998, Table  V.5).UnintEndEd migrAtion consEqUEncEs of Us WElfArE rEform 
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months) and the partial sanction period8 that follows (x denotes its length in months). Eligibles 
not complying with the work requirement after month t receive a partial benefit equal to pG 
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respectively. In (3), h >  h  at date i = 0 and between dates t + x and T, and superscript n 
differentiates new (destination) state policy from the original state’s.
Because the migration decision is made at date i = 0, it is based in part on future earnings 
expectations. Let w and 
n w  denote expected future wage rates in the home and destination 
state’s low-skilled labor market, respectively. In addition, eligibles expect to work h  between 
dates i = t + x and i = T to avoid the full sanction. Given these expectations, (1) and (3), and 






To simplify the analysis, let us assume there are type-A and B eligibles. Type-B eligibles 
are more detached from the labor market (i.e., lB > lA). Given public assistance policies, h 
and H are assumed to satisfy 0 h h H < < < and 0 h H h = < <  for A- and B-type eligibles, 
respectively. This determines leisure levels: l = L–H, L–h, 
n L h −  or L h − , where L is time 
split between work and leisure. It also reduces the decision set to m. With j = T for TAnF rules 
or A for AFdC rules, eligibles chose m to solve
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8  PRWORA requires states to reduce TAnF payments to families not satisfying work requirements, and  gives 
states considerable flexibility in determining the length and amount of sanctions. For example, first-time 
offenders living in Alabama lose part of benefit payments until they comply with work requirements, but 
would have lost all of it in Idaho for no less than one month (Gallagher et al. 1998, Table V.3).HAl W. snArr, dAniEl friEsnEr And mArk l. bUrkEy
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III. dEMOnSTRATInG COnSISTEnCY WITH PRIOR WELFARE 
MIGRATIOn STUdIES
Having developed our models, we are now in a position to discuss some of the basic migration 
consequences of TAnF, and demonstrate that the findings of our model are consistent with 
the current literature. Where appropriate, the incentives produced by TAnF policies are also 
compared to those generated under AFdC. The following propositions and corollaries provide 
these insights. Please refer to the Appendix of the paper for all proofs.
Proposition 1. AFdC-related migration (a) increases in the benefit and earnings differentials; 
(b) decreases in the cost of migrating, attachment to the home state, and distance of the move; 
and (c) is not influenced by differences in leisure levels across states.
Corollary 1 of Proposition 1. If AFdC participants expect wages to be equal across states, 
there is no incentive to migrate between states with the same antipoverty measures.
Proposition 2. TAnF-related migration (a) increases in the neighboring state’s benefit level 
and earnings differential; (b) decreases in the cost of migrating, attachment to the home state, 
and distance of the move; and (c) is influenced by differences in leisure levels across states.
Proposition 1 and its corollary are consistent with the empirical and theoretical results found in 
the AFdC migration literature. Eligibles are more likely to move to states with more generous 
benefits (Meyer 2000, Brueckner 2000, McKinnish 2005, 2007) and higher expected earnings 
(Brueckner 2000, Kennan and Walker 2010), which are functions of work disincentives 
and labor market expectations. As these differentials become larger, so too does the critical 
distance. A larger critical distance means a household is close (or sufficiently close) enough 
to a destination state to make it worthwhile to migrate (Brueckner 2000, Snarr and Burkey 
2006, McKinnish 2005). Proposition 1 also suggests that welfare migration is affected by 
attachment to the home state (Edin and Lein 1997, Schram, nitz and Krueger 1998, Graefe, 
de Jong and May 2006). 
A comparison of Proposition 2 to Proposition 1 and its corollary demonstrates the dramatic 
change in migration incentives. First, contrary to Kaestner, Kaushal, and Van Ryzin’s (2003) 
thesis and consistent with Snarr and Burkey (2006), the benefit-related migration incentive 
is stronger under TAnF. This is so because the benefit differential for those who reach the 
time limit or are fully sanctioned is the difference between getting something if they move or 
nothing if they don’t (Gn – 0). Second, the earnings differential between states is a function 
of sanction policy and work requirements, both of which also create leisure gains (or losses) 
between states with differing policies. 
Both  propositions  also  support  much  of  the  empirical  literature.  For  example,  both 
McKinnish (2007) and Snarr and Burkey (2006) find evidence of welfare migration across state 
lines. Similarly, differences in earnings and economic activities across home and destination 
states also increase the likelihood of welfare migration; a finding identified by both Kaestner, 
Kaushal and Van Ryzin (2003) and de Jong, Graefe, and St. Pierrre (2005).UnintEndEd migrAtion consEqUEncEs of Us WElfArE rEform 
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IV. nEW THEORETICAL InSIGHTS TO WELFARE MIGRATIOn
The primary contribution of our model lies in generating predictions which satisfy the critiques 
of de Jong, Graefe, and St. Pierrre (2005). That is, can our model predict whether issues such 
as an eligible’s level of myopia, labor force attachment, dynamic considerations and socio-
cultural characteristics influence whether or not a typical eligible migrates? The following 
corollaries to Propositions 1 and 2 address these critiques.9
Corollary 2 of Proposition 1. If AFdC participants expect wages to be equal across states, 
migration into high benefit states is greater among those more attached to the labor market.
Corollary 3 of Proposition 1. If AFdC participants expect wages to be equal across states, 
migration into high benefit states is greater among forward-looking agents.
Corollary 1.A of Proposition 2. If TAnF participants who are more attached to the labor 
market expect wages to be equal across states, there is a strong incentive to engage in benefit-
related migration even if states have chosen the same antipoverty measures. Furthermore, 
benefit-related migration is buoyed by gains in future leisure levels but offset by lost earnings. 
Corollary 1.B of Proposition 2. If TAnF participants who are relatively more detached from 
the labor market expect wages to be equal across states, there is a strong incentive to engage 
in benefit-related migration under TAnF even if states have chosen the same antipoverty 
measures. Between dates i = 1 and i = t + x, the incentive to migrate is buoyed by gains in 
leisure but offset by lost earnings. The opposite is true between dates i = t + x and i = T. 
Corollary 2 of Proposition 2. If TAnF participants expect wages to be equal across states, the 
incentive to migrate into high benefit, full sanction states with immediate work requirements 
is greater for more detached agents.
Corollary 3 of Proposition 2. If TAnF participants expect wages to be equal across states, the 
incentive to migrate into high benefit, full sanction states with immediate work requirements 
is greater for forward-looking agents.
The preceding corollaries provide a number of new inferences about welfare migration. 
First, under AFdC, eligibles who are highly detached from the labor market do not engage 
in employment-related migration. But under TAnF, the migration incentive increases in 
labor market detachment. Taken in tandem, these results imply several interesting inferences 
about labor market migration. For example, much of the empirical literature has found mixed 
evidence of welfare migration, and what migration that does exist is empirically explained by 
differences in labor market characteristics between states. Our finding supports these results, 
but in a more complex manner than what is suggested by the literature. Welfare recipients 
who are more attached to the labor market are actually more likely to migrate because they are 
more easily able to work to sustain family income (and, if the nature of the job allows, some 
level of benefits) while the move takes place, residency is established and TAnF benefits are 
9  In this section, high benefit states set bn < b, en > e and Gn > G.HAl W. snArr, dAniEl friEsnEr And mArk l. bUrkEy
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re-established in the new state. Moreover, even in the case of the more detached eligibles, 
the incentive depends on when and for how long the eligibles plan to work and/or how long 
they plan to prolong their benefits. Eligibles with very young children might be expected to 
have an incentive to stay out of the labor force and migrate in an attempt to prolong benefits 
until the children are old enough to attend school (i.e., in time period t + x). Eligibles with 
older children face a different labor-leisure tradeoff and decide not to migrate. Related to 
labor force attachment is the concept of myopia. Our results suggest that myopic agents are 
less likely to migrate because they attribute much less value to future benefit payments and 
earnings differentials. 
A second consideration is the impact of time; most notably the impact of time limits. Our 
normalization requiring time to begin at date i = 0 does not explicitly incorporate extending 
the time limit. However, it is straightforward to intuitively incorporate this into our analysis. 
A one month extension of the time limit obviously prolongs the migration decision by one 
month. Hence, states that are more apt to approve time limit exemptions should expect much 
less out-migration. States with long time limits in place should expect more in-migration if 
earnings gains (losses) are cancelled out by leisure losses (gains).10 If benefit and earnings 
effects dominate the leisure effect, states with longer work triggers should experience greater 
in-migration.11 States with lenient sanction policies12 or generous benefit levels and strong 
work incentives13 should experience greater in-migration. As with the previous factors, these 
results inform and/or clarify previous empirical results. Our findings are consistent with de 
Jong, Graefe, and St. Pierrre’s (2005) results associating stringent home state eligibility policies 
with increased out-migration. Their results do not, however, find that more lenient states attract 
welfare migrants, which is plausible in our model especially when earnings gains (losses) are 
not cancelled out by leisure losses (gains). Thus, it is the combination of policies and earnings 
opportunities in the destination states that are driving empirical results.
A final consideration is the migration distance eligibles are faced with. Clearly, distance 
matters, and higher relocation distances reduce the potential for migration. However, one 
should also keep in mind the definition of the distance term, which in our model is to the 
nearest viable destination state. In Snarr and Burkey (2006), as well as in McKinnish (2007), it 
was assumed that the definition of a “viable” distance is based on physical location. However, 
distance may also be based on other considerations, such as sociological and cultural (Axelsen, 
Underwood and Friesner 2009; Underwood, Axelsen and Friesner 2010). Many rely on a social 
support structure (a sibling or parent) to help with child care, household duties or emotional 
support, among other related factors (de Jong, Graefe, and St. Pierrre 2005). If that support 
network is contained locally, and if the eligible lives near a state border, then welfare flipping is 
10  The partial derivative of (A.2) with respect to T is positive if Gn is greater than the absolute value of 
(1 )( ) ln[( )/( )]
n n n h H w L h L H t l + − + − − . The left summand is the earnings gain (loss) for type-A 
(B)  agents, while the right summand is the gain (loss) in utility resulting from an increase in leisure for type-B   
(A) agents.
11   The partial derivative of (A.2) with respect to t is positive if benefit and earnings effects exceed the  leisure 
effect, which is likely for type-A agents especially if the sanction penalty is low (p ≈ 0). However,  the partial 
derivative is negative if the leisure effect is big enough, which is more likely for type-B agents  especially if 
sanction penalty is steep (p ≈ 1).
12  The partial derivatives of (A.2) with respect to p and x are unambiguously positive.
13  The signs of the partial derivatives of (A.2) with respect to Gn, en, and bn are clearly +,+, and -, respectively. UnintEndEd migrAtion consEqUEncEs of Us WElfArE rEform 
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entirely reasonable. However, if the social support structures matter in the migration decision, 
then an alternative support structure may be in a geographically distant state (e.g., Hispanic 
families split between California and Oregon), or in a state with more stringent eligibility 
rules. In those cases, it is entirely plausible to expect that no migration occurs because the 
costs of moving to the alternative location are too high; or that migration, if it occurs, does not 
result in local migration. Moreover, in the latter case, it is difficult to appropriately generate 
empirical estimates of welfare migration if the data do not include information on the location 
of the nearest viable destination state. Race, ethnicity, job opportunities, and neighbors living 
in adjacent states may simply be insufficient to characterize the complexity of these social 
networks and related economic institutions.
So, based on the model presented in this paper, is it possible to identify the characteristics 
of the welfare recipient most likely to practice welfare migration? In a narrow sense, the answer 
is “yes”. Individuals who are forward looking (non-myopic), who have a strong preference for 
leisure (household production) in the short term, who live near a state border, and have a social 
support structure in a neighboring state are unambiguously more likely to migrate to prolong 
welfare benefits. Table 1 and common sense suggest that this is a small proportion of recipients. 
In all others, whether eligibles migrate depends on the relative magnitudes of these conflicting 
incentives. For example, strong local support networks and geographic proximity to state lines 
will likely create migration if these effects outweigh differences in employment opportunities 
in the home and destination states, respectively. Alternatively, severely myopic eligibles may 
not migrate even if limited but positive economic opportunities and social structures in other 
states are available. Thus, it is not surprising that the empirical literature has produced mixed 
evidence of welfare migration. The only way to empirically disentangle these incentives is 
either to collect detailed information on social networks and/or use research designs which 
profile specific groups of welfare eligible households with an a priori propensity to migrate. 
V. COnCLUSIOnS
Together, our migration models shed much needed light on welfare migration before and after 
TAnF. Our results suggest there are new, different, very powerful incentives for migration. 
Under AFdC, benefits continued until the eligibles’ children reach adulthood. If benefit 
extensions were desired, eligibles had options in addition to welfare migration; for example, 
having additional children. Under TAnF, eligibles must move to continue receiving benefits 
after reaching the time limit. Low-income households may also migrate because their head 
is myopic or forward-looking, detached from or attached to the labor market. As such, our 
findings are consistent with other counter-examples in the welfare literature, which find that 
simple explanations posited by naïve economic models are insufficient to comprehensively 
explain agents’ behaviors (Snarr and Axelsen 2008). Our work also has practical implications. 
For example, given the individual qualities outlined in our propositions, migration decisions 
are influenced by economic institutions and policy, albeit in a different manner than what was 
previously hypothesized in the literature. One possible move might be made to avoid harsh 
sanction policies or tough work requirements. Other factors such as differentials in earnings 
and state earned income credit programs also contribute to migration decisions, and can be HAl W. snArr, dAniEl friEsnEr And mArk l. bUrkEy
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exploited by policy makers to achieve better outcomes.
Another implication of our model for empirical work relates to the techniques used to 
estimate welfare migration. Ultimately, all decision makers have different degrees of myopia, 
attachments to the labor force, etc., and face the present (i = 0) at different points in time—
especially now that more than 10 years have passed since the enactment of TAnF. This is 
especially true if eligibles “bank” welfare benefits. Thus, one of the reasons the literature hasn’t 
come to a consensus empirically is because these migration decisions are being “smeared” or 
averaged out across participants in given geographic areas. The usual difference-in-differences 
or regression approaches will likely not capture these effects unless one specifically formulates 
the empirical model using a theoretical foundation like the one that is laid out in this paper.
It is important to note that our model, while interesting, is not completely exhaustive in its 
modeling of changes under TAnF. It does not incorporate every possible set of socio-cultural 
economic factors, as doing so would make any attempt to model such decisions unwieldy. 
Similarly, our model does not explicitly incorporate information on whether and how preferences 
and constraints evolve over time (for example, as children age and leave the household) 
(Radzicki 1988). However, this paper represents an important next step because it provides a 
platform to build testable hypotheses and empirical models. Ultimately, the empirical work 
that follows will need to rely on micro-level data, a comprehensive set of policy, demographic, 
and economic variables, and the inclusion of spatial dependencies.
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APPEndIx
Table A1: Table of Symbology
Agent’s decision variables
m  Migration decision = 1 if the agent moves, otherwise = 0 
c  Monthly consumption level
h  Hours worked per month on welfare
H Hours worked per month off welfare
l Hours of leisure consumed each month
L  Total time available each month for work or leisure
Exogenous policy variables
T  Length of the neighboring state’s time limit
t  Length of the neighboring state’s work trigger
h Minimum hours of work required by the state 
x  Length of the neighboring state’s partial sanction period
G  Dollar value of monthly cash grant from the government
w  Hourly wage 
e  Earned Income Tax Credit rate
b  Benefit reduction rate
t  Net-tax on earnings (t = e – b)
p  Percent reduction in G after agent reaches work trigger t
n  Superscript that identifies the variables of the neighboring state
Exogenous parameters
m  Disutility associated with migrating at the end of month one 
b  Discount factor
l Relative disutility of work
d  Distance of the move (d and d denote the distances that makes the agent 
indifferent between migrating or not, under AFDC and TANF, respectively)
F  Fixed costs of migration
k Migration cost of moving each of d unitsUnintEndEd migrAtion consEqUEncEs of Us WElfArE rEform 
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Proof of Proposition 1. The agent moves if her expected lifetime utility is increased by moving 
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Solving this for d yields
    (A.1)
where
1 PV [ ]
n G G G
b
b − ∆ ≡ −
1 PV [(1 ) (1 ) ]
n n Y w w h
b
b t t − ∆ ≡ + − +
The agent moves as long as inequality (A.1) holds. If  ˆ d  is the “critical” distance that makes 
the agent indifferent between migrating or not ( A ˆ ( ) 0 V d ∆ = ), then 
  .  QED.
Proof of Corollary 1 of Proposition 1. Since agents expect wages to be the same across 
states (
n w w = ) and states have similar antipoverty policies ( ,
n b b =
n e e =  and 
n G G = ),
PV PV 0 Y G ∆ = ∆ =  and  ˆ /( ) d F k m = − + .
This means  A( ) 0 V d ∆ <   ˆ d d ∀ > . QED.
Proof of Corollary 2 of Proposition 1. Since 
n b b < , 
n e e >  and  n w w = , 




b t t − ∆ ≡ − ,
where subscript i denotes type of agent (A for type-A, B for type-B). For type-B agents, the 
present value earnings differential above is equal to zero (h = 0), but positive for type-A agents 
(h > 0). By assumption, 
n G G > . This means the present value benefit differential is positive:
1 PV [ ] 0
n G G G
b
b − ∆ ≡ − > .
Since 
A PV PV PV G Y G ∆ + ∆ > ∆ ,
A B ˆ ˆ d d > . QED.HAl W. snArr, dAniEl friEsnEr And mArk l. bUrkEy
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Proof of Corollary 3 of Proposition 1. If bf and bm represent the discount factors of forward-
looking and myopic agents, then bf > bm or 
1 1






b b − − >
Since 
n b b < , 
n e e > , 
n G G >  and  n w w = , 










i G G G
b
b − ∆ ≡ − > .
Therefore, 
PV PV f m Y Y ∆ > ∆  and PV PV f m G G ∆ > ∆ ,
which means, under the assumed conditions, forward looking agents are more likely to migrate 
under AFdC than myopic agents. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2. The agent moves to the nearest state if 
 
Solving for d yields
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− ∆ ≡ + − + ,UnintEndEd migrAtion consEqUEncEs of Us WElfArE rEform 
248
1 PV [(1 ) (1 ) ]
t x T T n n n




+ − ∆ ≡ + − + ,
1 PV [(1 ) (1 ) ]
T n n




− ∆ ≡ + − + ,
  ,
   .
The agent moves as long as inequality (A.2) holds. If  d 
 is the distance that makes the 
agent indifferent between migrating or not ( ( ) 0 j V d ∆ =  ), then
  .
Proof of Corollary 1.A of Proposition 2. Assume that agents expect wages to be equal across 
states (
n w w = ) and states have exactly the same antipoverty measures,  ,
n b b =
n e e =  and 
n G G = . Thus, agents have a strong incentive to engage in benefit-related migration in their 
final month of TAnF eligibility because
( )(1 )
1 PV 0
T t t x p n n G G
b b b b
b
+ − − − −
− = > .
Let hi and Hi denote the hours worked on and off welfare by a j type agent, respectively, and 
let lj denote the agent’s relative disutility for work. Because type-A agents work more if they 
remain living in their home states (HA > hA and  A ), H h >  we have 
1 A A A 1 PV [(1 )( ) ] 0




− ∆ = − + − + <
and
A 1 PV [(1 )( ) ] 0
t x T T




+ − ∆ = − + − + <
which counter benefit-related migration. However, working more in their home states means 




buoy benefit-related migration. QED.
Proof of Corollary 1.B of Proposition 2. Welfare recipients of either type are faced with the 
same present value benefit differential:
( )(1 )
1 PV 0
T t t x p n n G G
b b b b
b
+ − − − −
− = > .HAl W. snArr, dAniEl friEsnEr And mArk l. bUrkEy
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For type-B agents, hB = 0 and  B H h < . Therefore,
1 B 1 PV (1 ) 0




− ∆ = − + < ,
B B 1 PV [(1 )( ) ]
t x T T








t x Y + ∆  is positive if  /(1 ) b e h < + , where  B 1 / H h h ≡ − . Since the benefit reduction 
rate (b) typically ranges from 33 to 100 percent and the “phase-in” EITC rate (e) equal to 
40 percent,  /(1 ) b e +  ranges from 24 to 71 percent. If states set work requirements so that 
welfare recipients most detached from the labor market work about as much as they would off 
welfare, then h  would be set such that  B / H h  might range from 80 to 100 percent. Under 
these scenarios, h ranges from 0 to 20 percent, and so  B PV T
t x Y + ∆  is positive QED.
Proof of Corollary 2 of Proposition 2. An immediate work requirement and full sanction 
means the agent must work 
n h  at date i = 1 (the first month of residence) to collect G and 
p = 0. Since 
n b b < , 
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T n
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  ,
and subscript i denotes type of agent. First, notice that PV
n
jG is the same for either type of 
agent. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the following is not true: 
A B 1 1 PV PV T T Y Y ∆ < ∆ .  (A.3)
Then  A B 1 1 PV PV T T Y Y ∆ ≥ ∆  simplifies to 
A B [(1 ) (1 ) ] [(1 ) (1 ) ]
n n n n h e H w h e H w t t + − + ≥ + − + ,






A B PV PV T T Y Y ∞ ∞ ∆ > ∆ .  (A.5)
From inequality (A.4) we get LA > LB. Between dates i = 1 and i = T, inequality (A.4) 
suggests type-A agents have a larger leisure-related migration effects than type-B agents, 
while on the other hand inequality (A.3) suggests type-B agents have a larger earnings-related 
migration effect than type-A agents. Because inequality (A.5) occurs many periods into the 
future, equally forward looking agents of type A or B do not give this effect as much weight 
as the effects given in (A.3) and (A.4) when making the decision to move at date i = 0. Thus, 






Inequality (A.6) says that when type-A agents work much more off welfare than type-B 
agents the earnings-related migration effect relative to that of leisure is much smaller for them 
than it is for type-B agents. QED.
Proof of Corollary 3 of Proposition 2. An immediate work requirement and full sanction 
means the agent must work 
n h  at date i = 1 (the first month of residence) to collect G and p 
= 0. If bf and bm denote the discount factors of forward-looking and myopic agents, then bf 
> bm. Since 
n b b < , 






















− ∆ ≡ + − + ,









− ∆ ≡ − ,
  .
Since f m b b > implies T T
m f b b > , which implies
/(1 ) 1/(1 ) 1/(1 ) /(1 ) T T
f f m m m f b b b b b b − > − > − > − ,HAl W. snArr, dAniEl friEsnEr And mArk l. bUrkEy
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A B PV PV T T Y Y ∞ ∞ ∆ > ∆ .  (A.7)
next, we must show
1 1
T T
f f m m
f m
b b b b
b b
− −
− − > . 
define ( , ) ( )/(1 ) T g T b b b b ≡ − − .By the Mean Value Theorem,
[ ( , ) ( , )]/[ ] f m f m g T g T b b b b − −  is bounded by  ( , )/ m g T b b ∂ ∂ and ( , )/ f g T b b ∂ ∂  for some 
given T since f m b b > . For all T and b,
1
2
( , ) (1 )(1 )
(1 ) 0
T T g T T b b b b b
b b
− ∂ − − + −
∂ − = > .
Therefore, for all agents
PV PV
n n
f m G G > ,  (A.8) 
For type-A agents, 
1 1 PV PV 0
T T
f m m f Y Y ∆ < ∆ < < L < L   (A.9)
if  A (1 ) (1 ) n n e h e H + ≈ + . Since 
n n n n G h w b h w > > , the benefit level effect dominates the 
earnings differential effect in (A.9), and since all other effects were positive for type-A agents
f m d d >   . For type-B agents, we have
1 1 0 PV PV
T T
f m m f Y Y L < L < < ∆ < ∆    (A.10)
if  B 1 (1 ) / n n n b e e H h > + − + . (If en = 0.45, e = 0.40 and the type-B agent works about the 
same number of hours off welfare that she is required to on welfare ( 20
n h = , H = 17 to 19 
hours), then bn would have to be set larger than at least 0.26.) If the leisure differential effect 
in (A.10) is countered by the earnings differential effects in (A.7) and (A.10) and the benefit 
level effect in (A.8)  f m d d >   for type-B agents. QED.
 